In a communique dated Dec. 26, Mexico's rebel EZLN said it
was "obvious" that the paramilitaries involved in the Acteal
massacre "had military preparation of the type called 'special
commando.'" During the massacre the paramilitaries cut open the
uteruses of several pregnant women they had murdered. The EZLN
said that this "forms part of the 'teachings' that Guatemalan
soldiers (the so-called 'Kaibiles') gave their counterparts at
the beginning of the Zapatista uprising... A select group of
Federal Army officers took the 'Kaibil' course. Since then, new
groups have been trained in the neighboring country." [LJ
12/28/97] [As of May 1994, four Mexican officers had graduated
from the Kaibil counterinsurgency school in Guatemala--see Update
#226.] 
 
     Nuevo Amanecer Press reports that in 1996 the US Army
Special Forces began a massive training program of Mexico's
Airborne Special Forces Groups (GAFE) as part of the US "war on
drugs." "From fiscal year 1996 until fiscal year 1997, around
3,200 Mexican soldiers will receive training in Fort Bragg, North
Carolina, by the Green Berets' 7th Special Forces Group," the
news service writes. The Mexican news agency APRO reported on
Dec. 25 that "[a]n important detachment, composed of [GAFE]
members...was sent to the community of Acteal... The soldiers of
the GAFE, experts in counterinsurgency and specialized in
operating in rough terrain, as can be found in Chiapas,
immediately set up three roadblocks on the highway that leads
from the Chenalho to Acteal in order to meticulously search all
vehicles which passed through the troubled area.'" According to a
Dec. 26 article in the left-leaning Mexican daily La Jornada,
more than a dozen young men were kidnapped and tortured in a
recent GAFE operation in the state of Jalisco; one of the victims
died.
 
     Nuevo Amanecer Press reports that one of the GAFE officers
charged in Jalisco, Lt. Col. Julian Guerrero Barrios, is a
graduate of the US Army's School of the Americas, where he took a
course in 1981 entitled "Commando Operations." "[T]he mastermind
behind Mexico's counterinsurgency strategy in Chiapas, Gen. Mario
Renan Castillo Fernandez, has received instruction at Fort Bragg
as well... We find it odd that the two biggest recipients of US
military aid in Latin America, Colombia and Mexico, are also the
two Latin American countries with the greatest number of
massacres carried out by paramilitary organizations connected to
their respective armed forces." [NAP 12/28/97]
 
     On Dec. 29 the New York Times ran a front-page article
saying that the US is "providing the Mexican military with
extensive covert intelligence support and training hundreds of
its officers." The assistance "has included training, equipment
and advice from the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] to
establish an elite army intelligence unit that has quietly moved
to the forefront of Mexico's anti-drug effort." The training has
been under way since 1994, replacing a CIA program from the late
1980s. The earlier program was closed down after three failed
missions, including an Apr. 11, 1988 commando raid in Caborca
which killed four apprentice welders; the CIA-trained soldiers
mistook them for drug traffickers.
 
     In the current effort the CIA is training a 90-member unit
called the Center for Anti-Narcotics Investigations. The Times
writes that "Mexican and United States military officials said
there was nothing to stop the transfer of American-trained army
officers to similar special forces units that might be deployed
against leftist insurgents in southern states like Guerrero and
Chiapas... Several American officials compared the program to the
CIA's work in Colombia, where the agency has been credited with
critical help in the capture of major drug traffickers." [NYT
12/29/97]





                            
_________________________________________________________________
 

               MEXICAN ARMY INCURSION IN REBEL TOWN

_________________________________________________________________
 

                                
 

     In its most aggressive act against the rebel Zapatista
National Liberation Army (EZLN) since an unsuccessful offensive
in February 1995, on Jan. 3 the Mexican army sent almost 200
soldiers in 26 vehicles to La Realidad Trinidad, a community in
the southeastern state of Chiapas which the rebels have used as a
sort of headquarters over the last three years. According to
eyewitness reports, the soldiers arrived near La Realidad at
about 8 am, fanning out through the area around the community and
questioning--and sometimes threatening--campesinos. The incursion
ended at some point in the afternoon, and the soldiers withdrew
to their base about 10 miles away. There are no confirmed
incidents of violence, and the troops never occupied
"Aguascalientes," the large meeting place the EZLN uses for
public events. The military also ran surveillance flights over
the town during the operation, which the military said was a
search for weapons. [Associated Press 1/3/98; La Jornada (Mexico)
1/4/98]
 
     Previously, small military patrols had driven through the
community--which is in Las Margaritas municipality (county) in
the south-central part of the state, near the Guatemala border--
but the Jan. 3 incident was a significant escalation. La Realidad
residents packed their belongings and cooked food to be able to
flee if the soldiers attacked. "They have never come so close,"
Ramon Gutierrez, a local campesino, told the Associated Press.
"We had a meeting this afternoon because we think the army wants
to take the town, but we have decided to stay. If that's what
they want, they can finish us all off." [AP 1/3/98]
 
     The brief incursion caused panic in pro-rebel communities
throughout the state, already tense because of a Dec. 22 massacre
of 45 unarmed civilians by a rightwing paramilitary group in
Acteal, San Pedro de Chenalho municipality in the north [see
Update #413]. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the Catholic
diocese of San Cristobal de las Casas in the northern highlands
area, and the EZLN's civilian group, the Zapatista National
Liberation Front (FZLN), received false reports that the military
had seized La Realidad, and that EZLN headquarters had been
bombed. The diocese also received a report that the military's
surveillance flights had received orders in English referring to
a huge "military operation" on land and sea; diocese spokesperson
Father Gonzalo Ituarte said there were tapes of the
conversations, captured by shortwave radio, but that they were
probably not from the La Realidad area and had no relation to the
incursion there. [FZLN communique 1/3/98; LJ 1/4/98] Far from
being under attack, the EZLN issued a communique stating that
"[c]ommunication was cut off at 12 noon on Jan. 3 and we didn't
know what the situation was in the community of La Realidad or
how the companeros were." [EZLN communique 1/3/98] [There were
also unconfirmed reports that paramilitary groups took 40 Mexican
and international solidarity volunteers hostage in Oventic, north
of San Cristobal; the reports said 30 of the hostages were
subsequently released. [FZLN Communique 1/3/98; Information
posted on Internet from doctor at Gestion de Servicios de Salud
(San Cristobal) 1/3/98]]
 
     The British news service Reuter quickly picked up the story
of military activity in La Realidad, citing an eyewitness. The
Spanish news service EFE cited unnamed "military sources" as
saying that the army had "taken" the town. [Reuter 1/3/98; El
Mundo (Spain) 1/3/98 from EFE] The Mexican National Defense
Secretariat (SEDENA) 7th Military Region (Chiapas) denounced the
"rumor" of military action in La Realidad as "a deliberate act of
provocation"--presumably by the EZLN and the diocese--"to confuse
public opinion and, for unknown reasons, to alter the environment
in the Chiapas Highlands." [LJ 1/4/98] [Both accurate and
inaccurate accounts of the events circulated on the Internet
during the day, mobilizing EZLN supporters in Mexico and
internationally. New Yorkers organized a vigil at the Mexican
consulate before midnight on Jan. 3.]

 
                              
_________________________________________________________________

 
             MEXICAN CABINET CHANGED IN `PEACE PLAN'

_________________________________________________________________




                                
 
     At the same time that the Mexican military was stepping up
pressure on the EZLN on Jan. 3, Mexican president Ernesto Zedillo
Ponce de Leon announced the resignation of Governance Secretary
Emilio Chuayffet Chemor, a conservative in the ruling
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) who held the post since
June 1995. The governance secretary handles internal security and
is usually the most powerful member of the cabinet. Chuayffet's
predecessor, Esteban Moctezuma Barragan, was fired after the
massacre of 17 leftist campesinos by police in Aguas Blancas in
the southwestern state of Guerrero [see Update #283]. Although
Zedillo said Chuayffet resigned for personal reasons, most
analysts assume that the resignation was a de facto admission by
the government of its responsibility for the Acteal massacre,
allegedly organized by the PRI president of Chenalho
municipality. Agriculture Secretary Francisco Labastida Ochoa was
named to replace Chuayffet. "We will spare no effort, and the
will to achieve peace will not fail," Labastida announced,
implying that Chuayffet was responsible for the stalling of peace
talks with the EZLN since September 1996. [LJ 1/4/98; New York
Times 1/4/98]
 
     But the government's actions suggest that its strategy is
actually to increase the militarization of the state under the
pretext of disarming both the rebels and the paramilitary groups.
On Jan. 1 the military authorities announced that an army unit
specializing in counterinsurgency had discovered an arms cache in
the community of San Miguel Chiptic in Altamirano municipality;
the military suggested that the arms belonged to EZLN
sympathizers. [Agence France Presse 1/1/98] The next day, on Jan.
2, the 7th Military Region command announced that there would be
"intensive" patrols and roadblocks in three parts of the state:
the north, the Highlands and the Lacandona Forest. Indigenous
organizations say the military has set up 20 roadblocks in
Ocosingo, Altamirano, Las Margaritas and Palenque municipalities,
and that the searches carried out are thorough and sometimes
"aggressive." [LJ 1/3/98] According to Nuevo Amanecer Press, a
nonprofit news service, and Carlos Payan Velver, a federal deputy
from the center-left Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD),
the Mar. 9, 1995 enabling legislation for the peace negotiations
recognizes the EZLN as an armed group and therefore exempts the
rebels, but not the paramilitaries, from weapons searches. [NAP
1/2/98; LJ 1/4/98]
 
     On Jan. 3, at the same time as the military action at La
Realidad, a group of some 200 soldiers tried to establish an
encampment about 300 meters from X'oyep, Chenalho, a community
filled with refugees from paramilitary attacks in the area. Some
200 refugees, mostly women and children, quickly blocked the
soldiers, holding them off for four hours and chanting, in
Tzotzil, "Chiapas, Chiapas isn't a military base, get the army
out!" The civilians backed off after military riot police and a
helicopter arrived, but the soldiers failed to set up camp. [LJ
1/4/98]
 
     The Mexican military has also been active outside of
Chiapas. On Jan. 2 troops moved into the small community of El
Cucuyachi, in the Atoyac Sierra region of Guerrero, ostensibly to
prevent a confrontation between a local paramilitary group and
the Revolutionary Popular Army (EPR), a rebel group that operates
principally in Mexico's south and central states. The PRD
director in Atoyac, Wilebaldo Rojas Arellano, charged that the
troop deployment was meant to be "a blow against the PRD." The
military has repeatedly accused the Guerrero PRD of having links
to the EPR. [LJ 1/3/98]



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